Financial Frictions, Investment and Tobin's q by Guido Lorenzoni & Karl Walentin
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research or the Executive Board of Sveriges Riksbank.
© 2007 by Guido Lorenzoni and Karl Walentin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Financial Frictions, Investment and Tobin's q
Guido Lorenzoni and Karl Walentin




We develop a model of investment with financial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between
investment and Tobin's q. A firm is financed partly by insiders, who control its assets, and partly by
outside investors. When their wealth is scarce, insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market
rate of return, i.e., they receive a quasi-rent on invested capital. This rent is priced into the value of
the firm, so Tobin's q is driven by two forces: changes in the value of invested capital, and changes
in the value of the insiders' future rents per unit of capital. This weakens the correlation between q
and investment, relative to the frictionless benchmark. We present a calibrated version of the model,
which, due to this effect, generates realistic correlations between investment, q, and cash flow.
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The standard model of investment with convex adjustment costs predicts that movements in
the investment rate should be entirely explained by changes in Tobin’s q. This prediction has
generally been rejected in empirical studies, which show that cash ﬂow and other measures
of current proﬁtability have a strong predictive power for investment, after controlling for
Tobin’s q. This has been taken by many authors as prima facie evidence of the presence
of ﬁnancial constraints at the ﬁrm level. In recent papers, Gomes (2001) and Cooper
and Ejarque (2003) have challenged this interpretation. They compute dynamic general
equilibrium models with ﬁnancial frictions, calibrate them, and look at the relation between
Tobin’s q and investment in the simulated series. Their results show that, even in the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions, Tobin’s q still explains most of the variability in investment,
and cash ﬂow does not provide any additional explanatory power. This seems to echo a
concern raised by Chirinko (1993):
“Even though ﬁnancial market frictions impinge on the ﬁrm, q is a forward-
looking variable capturing the ramiﬁcations of these constraints on all the ﬁrm’s
decisions. Not only does q reﬂect proﬁtable opportunities in physical investment
but, depending on circumstances, q c a p i t a l i z e st h ei m p a c to fs o m eo ra l lﬁnancial
c o n s t r a i n t sa sw e l l . ” 1
In this paper we analyze this issue by building a model of investment with ﬁnancial
frictions caused by limited enforcement of ﬁnancial contracts. For each ﬁrm there is an
“insider,” which can be interpreted as the entrepreneur, the manager, or the controlling
shareholder. The insider has the ability to partially divert the assets of the ﬁrm and, if he
does so, he is punished by losing control of the ﬁrm. This imposes an upper bound on the
amount of outside ﬁnance that the insider is able to raise. In this framework, we are able
to fully characterize the optimal long-term ﬁnancial contract, and to derive the total value
of the state-contingent claims issued by the ﬁrm. This gives a measure of Tobin’s q and
allows us to study the joint equilibrium dynamics of investment, q,a n dc a s hﬂows.
Our main analytical result is that the ﬁnancial constraint introduces a positive wedge
between average q, which corresponds to Tobin’s q in our model, and marginal q,w h i c h
determines investment decisions. This wedge reﬂects the tension between the future prof-
itability of investment and the availability of internal funds in the short run. On the
quantitative side, we use a calibrated version of the model to show that this wedge varies
over time, breaking the one-to-one correspondence between investment and q which holds
in the frictionless model. When we run standard investment regressions on simulated data
we can obtain realistic coeﬃcients on q and cash ﬂow. Therefore, ﬁnancial frictions do help
to reconcile models of ﬁrms’ investment with the data.
1Chirinko (1993) p. 1903.
1Aside from the enforcement friction, our model is virtually identical to the classic
Hayashi (1982) model. In particular, it features convex adjustment costs and constant
returns to scale. This allows us to identify in a clean way the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial friction
on the equilibrium behavior of investment and q. In the benchmark model with quadratic
adjustment costs, the coeﬃcient of q in investment regressions is identical to the inverse of
the constant in front of the quadratic term. The presence of the ﬁnancial friction reduces
this coeﬃcient by a factor of 6 and gives a large positive coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow.
The main diﬀerence between our approach and that in Gomes (2001) and Cooper and
Ejarque (2003) is the modeling of the ﬁnancial constraint. They introduce a constraint
on the ﬂow of outside ﬁnance that can be issued each period. Here instead, we explicitly
model a contractual imperfection and solve for the optimal long-term contract. This adds
a state variable to the problem, namely the stock of existing liabilities of the ﬁrm, thus
generating slow-moving dynamics in the gap between internal funds and the desired level of
investment. As we shall see, these dynamics account for the empirical disconnect between
investment and q.
Our paper is related to the large theoretical literature on the macroeconomic implica-
tions of ﬁnancial frictions (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
Holmström and Tirole (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini
(2004)).2 In particular, our model provides a tractable framework that introduces long-
term, state-contingent ﬁnancial contracts, into a standard general equilibrium model with
adjustment costs. The form of limited enforcement we adopt, and the recursive characteri-
zation of the optimal contract, are related to the approach in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn
(2004). By exploiting constant returns to scale, we are able to simplify the analysis of the
optimal contract, which takes a linear form, making aggregation straightforward. In this
sense, the model retains the simplicity of a representative agent model, while allowing for
rich dynamics of net worth, proﬁts and investment.
Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) there has been a large empirical lit-
erature exploring the relation between investment and asset prices using ﬁrm level data.
The great majority of these papers have found small coeﬃcients on Tobin’s q and positive
and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on cash ﬂow, or other variables describing the current ﬁnancial
condition of a ﬁrm.3 This result has been ascribed to measurement error in q,p o s s i b l y
caused by non-fundamental stock market movements.4 Measurement error would reduce
the explanatory power of q,a n dc a s hﬂow would then appear as signiﬁcant, given that it
is a good predictor of future proﬁts. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) show that this is
2See Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) for a survey.
3E.g. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). See Hubbard (1998) for a
survey.
4The debate is open whether non-fundamental movements in q should aﬀect investment or not. See
Chirinko and Shaller (2001), Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005) and Panageas (2005).
2insuﬃcient to explain the failure of q theory in investment regressions.5 They replace the
value of q obtained by ﬁnancial market prices with a measure of “fundamental q”( w h i c h
employs current cash ﬂow as a predictor of future proﬁts), and they show that current cash
ﬂow retains its independent explanatory power. The evidence in this literature provides the
starting motivation for our exercise. In an extension of the model (Section 4) we introduce
ﬁrm-level heterogeneity and further explore the connection between our model and panel
data evidence.
The idea of looking at the statistical implications of a simulated model to understand
the empirical correlation between investment and q goes back to Sargent (1980). Recently,
Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2001, 2003) and Abel and Eberly (2004, 2005) have
followed this route, introducing both ﬁnancial frictions and decreasing returns and market
power to match the existing empirical evidence. This literature concludes that decreasing
returns and market power help to generate realistic correlations, while ﬁnancial frictions do
not.6 In this paper we show that the second conclusion is unwarranted, and depends on
the way one models the ﬁnancial constraint. On the other hand, there are some parallels
between our approach and these papers, in particular with the “growth options” mechanism
emphasized in Abel and Eberly (2005). Both approaches imply that movements in q can
reﬂect changes in future rents that are unrelated to current investment. In our paper these
rents are not due to market power, but to the scarcity of entrepreneurial wealth, which
evolves endogenously.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the derivation of the
optimal contract, and the equilibrium analysis. Section 3 contains the calibration and
simulation results. In Section 4 we extend the model to allow for ﬁrm-level heterogeneity.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs not in the text are in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The environment
Consider an economy populated by two groups of agents of equal mass, consumers and
entrepreneurs. Consumers are inﬁnitely lived and have a ﬁxed endowment of labor lC,w h i c h
they supply inelastically on the labor market at the wage wt. Consumers are risk neutral
and have a discount factor βC. Entrepreneurs have ﬁnite lives, with a constant probability
of death γ. Each period, a fraction γ of entrepreneurs is replaced by an equal mass of newly
born entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs begin life with no capital and have a labor endowment
lE in the ﬁrst period of life, which gives them an initial wealth wtlE. Entrepreneurs are
also risk neutral, with a discount factor βE <β C. The last assumption, together with the
5See Erickson and Whited (2000) and Bond and Cummins (2001) for a contrarian view. See Rauh (2006)
for recent evidence in favor of the ﬁnancial frictions interpretation.
6See Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) for an early study of q theory in a model where ﬁrms have
market power.
3assumption of ﬁnitely lived entrepreneurs, is needed to ensure the existence of a steady
state with a binding ﬁnancial constraint. We normalize total labor supply to one, that is,
lC + γlE =1 .
Starting in their second period of life, entrepreneurs have access to the constant-returns-
to-scale technology AtF (kt,l t),w h e r ekt is the stock of capital installed in period t−1,a n d
lt is labor hired on the labor market. The productivity At is equal across entrepreneurs and
follows the stationary stochastic process At = Γ(At−1,  t),w h e r e t is an i.i.d. shock drawn
from the discrete p.d.f. π( t). We normalize the unconditional mean of At to 1.
Investment in new capital is subject to convex adjustment costs. In order to have kt+1
units of capital ready for production in period t +1 , an entrepreneur with ko
t units of
used capital needs to employ G(kt+1,ko
t) units of the consumption good at date t.T h e
adjustment cost function G is convex in kt+1, homogeneous of degree one, and satisﬁes
∂G(kt+1,ko
t)/∂kt+1 =1if kt+1 = ko
t.7 There is a competitive market for used capital,
where entrepreneurs can buy and sell capital at the price qo
t, after production has taken
place. This allows individual entrepreneurs to choose ko
t 6= kt.H o w e v e r ,m a r k e tc l e a r i n gi n
the used capital market requires that the aggregate value of ko
t across entrepreneurs equals
the aggregate value of kt, denoted by Kt.8
An entrepreneur born at date t0 ﬁnances his current and future investment by issuing a
long-term ﬁnancial contract, specifying a sequence of state-contingent transfers (which can
be positive or negative) from the entrepreneur to the outside investors, {dt}
∞
t=t0.I np e r i o d





t ≤ wtlE − dt.
The entrepreneur uses his initial wealth to consume and to acquire used capital and trans-
form it into capital ready for use in t0 +1 . Furthermore, he can increase his consumption
and investment by borrowing from consumers, i.e., choosing a negative value for dt0.I nt h e





t − kt) ≤ AtF (kt,l t) − wtlt − dt.
He uses current revenues, net of labor costs and ﬁnancial payments, to ﬁnance consumption
and investment. At the beginning of each period t, the entrepreneur learns whether that is
his last period of activity. Therefore, in the last period, he liquidates all the capital kt and
consumes the receipts, setting
cE
t = AtF (kt,l t) − wtlt + qo
tkt − dt.
7To keep notation compact G(kt+1,k
o
t) includes both the direct cost of investment and the adjustment
costs. See (14) below, for the explicit functional form used in the quantitative part.
8To simplify notation we do not introduce indexes for individual entrepreneurs, although the value of kt
will be diﬀerent across entrepreneurs born at diﬀerent dates τ<t .
4From then on, the payments dt are set to zero.
Financial contracts are subject to limited enforcement. The entrepreneur controls the
ﬁrm’s assets kt a n dc a n ,i ne a c hp e r i o d ,r u na w a y ,d i v e r t i n gaf r a c t i o n(1 − θ) of them. If
he does so, he re-enters the ﬁnancial market as if he was a young entrepreneur, with initial
wealth given by the value of the diverted assets, and zero liabilities. That is, the only
punishment for a defaulting entrepreneur is the loss of a fraction θ of the ﬁrm’s assets.9
Aside from limited enforcement no other imperfections are present, in particular, ﬁnancial
contracts are allowed to be fully state-contingent.
2.2 Recursive competitive equilibrium
We will focus our attention on recursive equilibria where the economy’s dynamics are fully
characterized by the vector of aggregate state variables Xt ≡ (At,K t,B t),w h e r eKt is
the aggregate capital stock and Bt denotes the aggregate liabilities of the entrepreneurs,
to be deﬁned in a moment. In the equilibria considered, consumers always have positive
consumption. Therefore, the market discount factor is equal to their discount factor, βC,









The variable Bt is equal to the economy-wide aggregate of these liabilities.
A recursive competitive equilibrium is deﬁned by law of motions for the endogenous
state variables:
Kt = K(Xt−1),
Bt = B(Xt−1,  t),
and by two maps, w(Xt) and qo (Xt), which give the market prices as a function of the
current state. Given these four objects, we can derive the optimal individual behavior
of the entrepreneurs. The quadruple K,B,w(.) and qo (.) forms a recursive competitive
equilibrium if: (i) the entrepreneurs’ optimal behavior is consistent with the law of motions
K and B, and (ii) the labor and used capital market clear. In the next two subsections, we
ﬁrst characterize entrepreneurs’ decisions, and then aggregate and check market clearing.
We use
Xt = H (Xt−1,  t),
to denote in a compact way the law of motion for Xt derived from the laws of motion
Γ,K,a n dB.
9Here, we just take this as an institutional assumption. For a microfoundation, we could assume that
defaulting entrepreneurs are indistinguishable from young entrepreneurs. However, this would require ad-
dressing a number of informational issues, which would considerably complicate the analysis.
52.3 Optimal ﬁnancial contracts
Let us consider ﬁrst the optimization problem of the individual entrepreneur. Exploiting
the assumption of constant returns to scale, we will show that the individual problem is
linear. This property will greatly simplify aggregation.
We describe the problem in recursive form, dropping time subscripts. Consider a contin-
uing entrepreneur, in state X,w h oc o n t r o l saﬁrm with capital k and outstanding liabilities b.
Let V (k,b,X) denote his end-of-period expected utility, computed after production takes
place and assuming that the entrepreneur chooses not to default in the current period. The
entrepreneur takes as given the law of motion for the aggregate state X and the pricing
functions w(X) and qo (X).




+ qo (X)ko ≤ AF (k,l) − w(X)l + qo (X)k − d.
Lemma 1 allows us to rewrite it as
cE + qm (X)k0 ≤ R(X)k − d, (1)
where qm (X) is the shadow price of the new capital k0,a n dR(X) is the (gross) return per
unit of capital, on the installed capital k.
Lemma 1 Given the prices w(X) and qo (X), there are two functions qm (X) and R(X)
that satisfy the following conditions for any k0 and k,








R(X)k =m a x
l
{AF (k,l) − w(X)l} + qo (X)k.
This lemma exploits the assumption of constant returns to show that qm (X) and R(X)
are independent of the current and future capital stocks, k and k0, and only depend on the
prices w(X) and qo (X).T h ev a r i a b l eqm (X) is equal to marginal q in our model, and will
b ed i s c u s s e di nd e t a i lb e l o w .
A continuing entrepreneur can satisfy his existing liabilities b either by repaying now
or by promising future repayments. Let b0 ( 0) denote next-period liabilities, contingent on
the realization of the aggregate shock  0, if tomorrow is not a terminal date, and let b0
L ( 0)
denote the same in the event of termination. Then, the entrepreneur faces the constraint
b = d + βC
¡









where the expectation is taken with respect to  0.
The entrepreneur has to ensure that his future promised repayments are credible. Recall
that, if the entrepreneur defaults, his liabilities are set to zero and he has access to a
6fraction (1 − θ) of the capital. Therefore, if tomorrow is a continuation date, his promised
repayments b0 ( 0) have to satisfy the no-default condition
V (k0,b 0 ¡
 0¢
,X0) ≥ V ((1 − θ)k0,0,X0) (3)
for all  0. Throughout this section, X0 stands for H (X, 0). If tomorrow is the ﬁnal period,
the entrepreneur can either liquidate his ﬁrm, getting R(X0)k0, and repay his liabilities,













which again needs to hold for all  0.
We are now ready to write the Bellman equation for the entrepreneur:
V (k,b,X)= m a x
cE,k0,b0(.),b0
L(.)


















s.t. (1), (2), (3) and (4).
Notice that, except for constraint (3), all constraints are linear in the individual states
k and b, and in the choice variables cE,k0,b 0 (.) and b0
L (.). Let us make the conjecture that
the value function is linear and takes the form
V (k,b,X)=φ(X)(R(X)k − b), (5)
for some positive, state-contingent function φ(X). Then, the no-default condition (3) be-







This is a form of “collateral constraint,” which implies that an entrepreneur can only pledge
a fraction θ of the future gross returns R(X0)k.10 The crucial diﬀerence with similar
constraints in the literature (e.g., in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)), is the fact that we allow
for fully state-contingent securities.
Before stating Proposition 3, we impose some restrictions on the equilibrium prices w(.)
and qo (.) a n do nt h el a wo fm o t i o nH. These conditions ensure that the entrepreneur’s
problem is well deﬁned and deliver a simple optimal contract where the collateral constraint
(3’) is always binding. In subsection 2.4 we will verify that these conditions are met in
equilibrium.
Suppose the law of motion H admits an ergodic distribution for the aggregate state X,
10Constraint (4) immediately gives an analogous inequality for b
0
L.
7with support X. Assume that equilibrium prices are such that the following inequalities












<q m (X), (b)
and
(1 − γ)(1− θ)E[R(X0)]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(X0)]
< 1. (c)
Condition (a) implies that the expected rate of return on capital E[R(X0)]/qm (X) is greater
than the entrepreneur’s discount factor, so a continuing entrepreneur prefers investment to
consumption. Condition (b) implies that “pledgeable” returns are insuﬃcient to ﬁnance
the purchase of one unit of capital, i.e., investment cannot be fully ﬁnanced with outside
funds. This condition ensures that investment is ﬁnite. Finally, condition (c) ensures that
the entrepreneur’s utility is bounded.
Before introducing one last condition, we need to deﬁne a function φ,w h i c hs u m m a r i z e s
information about current and future prices.
Lemma 2 When conditions (a)-(c) hold, there exists a unique function φ : X → [1,∞)
that satisﬁe st h ef o l l o w i n gr e c u r s i v ed e ﬁnition
φ(X)=
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(X0))R(X0)]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(X0)]
. (6)
This function satisﬁes φ(X) > 1 for all X ∈ X.








for all X ∈ X and all X0 = H (X, 0). Condition (d) ensures that entrepreneurs never delay
investment. Namely, it implies that they always prefer to invest in physical capital today
rather than buying a state-contingent security that pays in some future state.
The function φ deﬁn e di nL e m m a2w i l lp l a yac e n t r a lr o l ei nt h er e s to ft h ea n a l y s i s .
The next proposition shows that substituting φ(X) o nt h er i g h t - h a n ds i d eo f( 5 ) ,g i v e su s
the value function for the entrepreneur (justifying our slight abuse of notation). Deﬁne the
net worth of the entrepreneur
n(k,b,X) ≡ R(X)k − b,
which represents the diﬀerence between the liquidation value of the ﬁrm and the value of
its liabilities. Equation (5) implies that expected utility is a linear function of net worth
8and φ(X) represents the marginal value of entrepreneurial net worth.W ew i l lg ob a c kt o
its interpretation in subsection 2.5.
Proposition 3 Suppose the aggregate law of motion H and the equilibrium prices w(.) and
qo (.) are such that (a)-(d) hold, where φ is deﬁned as in Lemma 2. Then, the value function
















The entrepreneur’s problem can be analyzed under weaker versions of conditions (a)-(d).
However, as we shall see in a moment, these conditions are appropriate for studying small
stochastic ﬂuctuations around a steady state where the ﬁnancial constraint is binding.
2.4 Aggregation
Having characterized optimal individual behavior, we now aggregate and impose market
clearing on the labor market and on the used capital market. To help the reading of the
dynamics, we now revert to using time subscripts.
Each period, a fraction γ of entrepreneurs begins life with zero capital and labor income
wtlE. Their net worth is simply equal to their labor income. Moreover, a fraction (1 − γ)
of continuing entrepreneurs has net worth equal to nt = Rtkt−bt. The aggregate net worth
of the entrepreneurial sector, excluding entrepreneurs in the last period of activity, is then
given by
Nt =( 1− γ)(RtKt − Bt)+γwtlE.
Using the optimal individual rules (7) and (8), we get the following dynamics for the ag-
gregate states Kt and Bt
Kt+1 =
(1 − γ)(RtKt − Bt)+γwtlE
qm
t − θβCEt [Rt+1]
, (9)
Bt+1 = βCθRt+1Kt+1. (10)
Finally, the following conditions ensure that the prices wt and qo
t are consistent with market










To clarify the role of condition (12), notice that all continuing entrepreneurs choose the same
9ratio ko




Market clearing on the used capital market requires that continuing entrepreneurs acquire
all the existing capital stock, so Kt/Kt+1 is equal to ko
t/kt+1. This gives us condition (12).
Summing up, we have found a recursive equilibrium if the laws of motion K and B and
the pricing rules for wt and qo
t satisfy (9) to (12), and if they are such that conditions (a)-(d)
are satisﬁed. The next proposition shows that an equilibrium with these properties exists












To construct a recursive equilibrium, we consider a deterministic version of the same econ-
omy (i.e., an economy where At is constant and equal to 1), and use the deterministic steady




be the support of At in the stochastic economy.
Proposition 4 Consider an economy with Cobb-Douglas technology and quadratic adjust-
ment costs. Suppose the economy’s parameters satisfy conditions (A) and (B) (in the ap-
pendix). Then there is a scalar ∆ > 0 such that, if A − A < ∆ there exists a recursive
competitive equilibrium with aggregate dynamics described by (9)-(10).
The conditions (A) and (B) presented in the Appendix ensure that the economy has a lo-
cally stable deterministic steady state with binding ﬁnancial constraints. These parametric
restrictions are satisﬁed in all the calibrations considered below.
Finally, as a useful benchmark, let us brieﬂy characterize the frictionless equilibrium
which arises when θ =1 . In the frictionless benchmark, equilibrium dynamics are fully
characterized by the condition
qm
t = βCEt [Rt+1]. (15)
The deﬁnitions of qm
t and Rt are the same as those given in the constrained economy,
and so are the equilibrium conditions (11) and (12) for wt and qo
t.G i v e n t h a t βE <β C
entrepreneurs consume their wealth wtlE in the ﬁrst period of their life and consume zero
in all future periods. Investment is entirely ﬁnanced by consumers, which explains why the
consumers’ discount factor appears in the equilibrium condition (15).
2.5 Average q and marginal q
Having characterized equilibrium dynamics, we can now derive the appropriate expressions
for Tobin’s q and for marginal q. Marginal q is immediately derived from the entrepreneur’s
problem as the shadow value of new capital, qm
t . The deﬁnition of qm
t in Lemma 1 and the






This is the standard result in economies with convex adjustment costs: there is a one-to-one
relation between the investment rate and the shadow price of new capital.
To derive Tobin’s q,w eﬁrst need to obtain the ﬁnancial value of a representative ﬁrm,
that is, the sum of the value of all the claims on the ﬁrm’s future revenue, held by insiders
(entrepreneurs) and outsiders (consumers). For ﬁrms in the last period of activity this value
is zero. For continuing ﬁrms, this gives us the expression
pt ≡ V (kt,b t,X t)+bt − dt. (16)
We subtract the current payments to outsiders, dt, to obtain the end-of-period value of the
ﬁrm. Recall that continuing entrepreneurs receive zero payments in the optimal contract
(except in the ﬁnal date), so there is no need to subtract current payments to insiders.
Dividing the ﬁnancial value of the ﬁrm by the total capital invested we obtain our





In the recursive equilibrium described above, qt i st h es a m ef o ra l lc o n t i n u i n gﬁrms. For
liquidating ﬁrms both pt and kt+1 are zero, so qt is not deﬁned for those ﬁrms.
The next proposition shows that the ﬁnancial constraint introduces a wedge between
marginal q and average q, and that the wedge is determined by φt,t h em a r g i n a lv a l u eo f
entrepreneurial wealth.
Proposition 5 In the recursive equilibrium described in Proposition 4, average q is the
same for all continuing ﬁrms and is greater than marginal q, qt >q m
t . Everything else
equal, the ratio qt/qm
t is increasing in φt.
Proof. Substituting the value function in the value of the ﬁrm (16), and rearranging
gives
pt =( φt − 1)(Rtkt − bt)+Rtkt − dt. (17)
Using the entrepreneur’s budget constraint, constant returns to scale for G, and the equi-
librium properties of qo
t and qm
t ,g i v e s


















11Substituting in (17) and rearranging gives





Notice that (7) implies that (Rtkt − bt)/kt+1 is equal across continuing ﬁrms. Given that
φt > 1 and bt ≤ θRtkt <R tkt the stated results follow from this expression.
Notice that in the frictionless benchmark investment is fully ﬁnanced by consumers and
we have bt = Rtkt, which immediately implies qt = qm
t . In this case, the model boils down
to the Hayashi (1982) model: average q is identical to marginal q and is a suﬃcient statistic
for investment.
It is useful to provide some explanation for the wedge between average q and marginal q
in the constrained economy. First, notice that this wedge is not due to the diﬀerence in
the discount factors of entrepreneurs and consumers. In fact, if we evaluated the expected
present value of the entrepreneur’s payoﬀs {cE
t+j} using the discount factor βC instead of
βE, we would get a quantity greater than V (kt,b t,X t) and the measured wedge would be
larger.11 The fundamental reason why the wedge is positive is that φt > 1,t h em a r g i n a l
value of entrepreneurial wealth is larger than one. If φt was equal to 1, then the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of (18) would be zero and the wedge would disappear.
To clarify the mechanism, consider an entrepreneur who begins life with one dollar
of wealth. Suppose he uses this wealth to start a ﬁrm ﬁnanced only with inside funds
and consumes the receipts at date t +1 . The (shadow) price of a unit of capital is qm
t ,
so the entrepreneur can install 1/qm
t units of capital. In period t +1he receives and
consumes Rt+1/qm
t . The value of the ﬁrm for the entrepreneur is then βEEt [Rt+1]/qm
t
which is greater than one, by condition (a). In short, the value of a unit of installed capital
is larger inside the ﬁrm than outside the ﬁrm, and this explains why q theory does not hold.
This discrepancy does not open an arbitrage opportunity, because the agents that can take
advantage of this opportunity (the entrepreneurs) are against a ﬁnancial constraint. This
thought experiment captures the basic intuition behind Proposition 5.
To go one step further, notice that the entrepreneur can do better than following the
strategy described above. In particular, he can use borrowed funds on top of his own
funds, and he can re-invest the revenues made at t+1, rather than consume. The ability of
borrowing allows the entrepreneur to earn an expected leveraged return, between t and t+1,
11For the quantitative results presented in Section 3, we also experimented with this alternative deﬁnition
of q (discounting the entrepreneur’s claims at the rate βC instead of βE), with minimal eﬀects on the results.
12equal to12
(1 − θ)Et [Rt+1]/(qm
t − θβCEt [Rt+1]) > Et [Rt+1]/qm
t .
Iterating expression (6) forward shows that φt is a geometric cumulate of future leveraged
returns discounted at the rate βE, taking into account the fact that, as long as the en-
trepreneur remains active, he can reinvest the returns made in his ﬁrm. Therefore, when
borrowing and reinvestment are taken into account, one dollar of wealth allows the entre-
preneur to obtain a value of φt >β EEt [Rt+1]/qm
t > 1. At the same time, the entrepreneur
is receiving qm
t kt+1 − 1 from outside investors (recall that he only has 1 dollar of internal
funds). Therefore, the value of the claims issued to outsiders must equal qm
t kt+1−1.I nc o n -
clusion, an entrepreneur with one dollar to invest can start a ﬁrm valued at φt+qm
t kt+1−1,
which is larger than the value of invested capital, qm
t kt+1,g i v e nt h a tφt > 1.
3 Quantitative Implications
In this section, we examine the quantitative implications of the model looking at the joint
behavior of investment, Tobin’s q,a n dc a s hﬂow in a simulated economy. First, we give
a basic quantitative characterization of the economy’s response to a productivity shock.
Second, we ask whether the wedge between marginal q and average q in our model helps to
explain the empirical failure of q theory in investment regressions.
3.1 Baseline calibration
The production function is Cobb-Douglas and adjustment costs are quadratic, as speciﬁed
in (13) and (14). The productivity process is given by At = eat,w h e r eat follows the
autoregressive process
at = ρat−1 +  t,
with  t a Gaussian, i.i.d. shock.13
12Notice that, from (7), 1//(q
m
t − θβCEt [Rt+1]) is the capital stock kt+1 which can be invested by an
entrepreneur with one dollar of wealth. In t +1the entrepreneur has to repay θRt+1kt+1 and can keep





The inequality follows from (a) and βC >β E.
13The theoretical analysis can be extended to the case where  t is a continuous variable. To ensure that
At is bounded, we set At = A whenever e
at <Aand At = A whenever e
at > A.A sl o n ga sσ
2
  is small the
bounds A and A are immaterial for the results.
13βC 0.97 βE 0.96
α 0.33 δ 0.05
ξ 8.5 ρ 0.75
θ 0.3 γ 0.06
lE 0.2
Table 1. Baseline calibration.
The baseline parameters for our calibration are reported in Table 1. The time period is a
year, so we set βC to give an interest rate of 3%. For the discount factor of the entrepreneurs,
we choose a value smaller but close to that of the consumers. The values for α and δ are
standard. The values of ξ and ρ are chosen to match basic features of ﬁrm-level data on
cash ﬂow and investment. In particular, we consider the following statistics, obtained from
the Compustat dataset.14
r(CFK) σ (IK) σ (CFK)
0.51 0.061 0.128
where CFK denotes cash ﬂow per unit of capital invested, IK denotes the investment
rate, r(.) denotes the (yearly) coeﬃcient of serial correlation, and σ (.) the standard devia-
tion. We calibrate ρ so that our simulated series replicate the autocorrelation of cash ﬂow
r(CFK)=0 .51. In our baseline calibration this gives us ρ =0 .75.W e s e t ξ to match
the ratio between cash ﬂow volatility and investment volatility, σ (IK)/σ(CFK)=0 .48.
Given all the other parameters, this gives us ξ =8 .5.
Finally, the parameters θ,γ, and lE are chosen as follows. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen
(1988) report that 30% of manufacturing investment is ﬁnanced externally. Based on this,
we choose θ =0 .3. The parameters γ and lE are chosen to obtain an outside ﬁnance premium
of 2%, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000). We experimented with diﬀerent values
of γ and lE and found that, as long as the ﬁnance premium remains at 2%, the speciﬁc
choice of these two parameters has minimal eﬀects on our results.
3.2 Impulse responses
In the model, the net investment rate of the representative ﬁrm is
IKt ≡
kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt
kt
,
14We use the same data from Compustat as Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995). The sample consists of 428
U.S. stock market listed ﬁrms from 1978 to 1989. We use the code of João Ejarque to calculate ﬁrm-speciﬁc
statistics separately for each variable. The moments reported in this paper are the means across all ﬁrms.
Any ratio used (e.g. σ(IK)/σ (CFK))i sar a t i oo fs u c hm e a n s .














Figure 1: Responses of investment, q,a n dc a s hﬂow to a technology shock.
and the ratio of cash ﬂow to the ﬁrm’s capital stock is
CFKt ≡
AtF (kt,l t) − wtlt
kt
.
Figure 1 plots the responses of IKt, qt,a n dCFKt, following a positive technology shock.
All variables are expressed in terms of deviations from their steady-state values.
All three variables in Figure 1 increase on impact, as in the standard model without
ﬁnancial frictions. However, the dynamics of average q are now jointly determined by
marginal q a n db yt h ew e d g eqt/qm
t .M a r g i n a lq moves one for one with investment. Average
q initially rises with investment, but at some point (3 periods after the shock) it falls below
its steady-state value, while investment continues to be above the steady state for several
more periods (up to period 6 periods after the shock). As marginal q is reverting towards its
steady state the wedge remains large, thus pushing average q below the steady state. The
slow-moving dynamics of the wedge are responsible for breaking the synchronicity between
average q and investment.













Figure 2: Responses of φ and expected returns to a technology shock.
In Proposition 5, we argued that the ratio of average q to marginal q is positively related
to φt, the marginal value of entrepreneurial net worth. The top panel of Figure 2 plots the
response of φt to the same technology shock, showing that φt decreases on impact following
the shock, and then slowly reverts to its steady-state value. The slow adjustment in the
wedge is closely related to the slow adjustment of φt.
To understand the response of φt, recall from the discussion in subsection 2.5 that the
dynamics of φt are closely related to those of the rate of return Et [Rt+1]/qm
t ,s i n c eφt
is a forward-looking measure which cumulates the discounted returns on entrepreneurial
investment in all future periods. The dynamics of φt reﬂect the fact that the rate of return
on entrepreneurial investment drops following a positive technology shock, as shown in
the bottom panel of Figure 2.15 Two opposite forces are at work here. First, due to the
persistent nature of the shock, future productivity increases and this raises expected returns
per unit of capital, Rt+1. This tends to increase the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth.
At the same time, entrepreneurs’ net worth increases because of the current increase in cash
ﬂow. This leads to an increase in Kt+1, which reduces Rt+1, due to decreasing returns to
capital, and increases qm
t , due to adjustment costs. These eﬀects tend to reduce the marginal
value of entrepreneurial wealth. In the case considered, the second channel dominates and
the net eﬀect is a reduction in Et [Rt+1]/qm
t and in φt. As we will see in subsection 3.5, this
15Since the market rate of return is constant and equal to 1/βC, this also implies that the “outside ﬁnance
premium” Et [Rt+1]/q
m
t − 1/βC decreases following a positive shock.
16result depends of the type of shock considered, and can be reversed if we consider shocks
with greater persistence. For now, what matters is that the dynamic response of φt breaks
the one-to-one correspondence between IKt and qt.
3.3 Investment regressions
We now turn to investment regressions, and ask whether our model can replicate the coeﬃ-
cients on q and cash ﬂow observed in the data. To do so, we generate simulated time series
from our calibrated model and run the standard investment regression
IKt = a0 + a1qt + a2CFKt + et. (19)
The regression coeﬃcients for the simulated model are presented in the ﬁrst row of Table
2. As reference points, we report the coeﬃcients that arise in the model without ﬁnancial
frictions (θ =1 )a n dt h ee m p i r i c a lc o e ﬃcients obtained by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
The latter are representative of the orders of magnitude obtained in empirical studies.
Absent ﬁnancial frictions, q is a suﬃcient statistic for investment, so the model gives a
coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow equal to zero. In this case, the coeﬃcient on q is equal to 1/ξ,
which, given the calibration above is equal to 0.118, a value substantially higher than those
obtained in empirical regressions. Adding ﬁnancial frictions helps both to obtain a positive
coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow and a smaller coeﬃcient on q. The impulse response functions
reported in Figure 1 help us to understand why. Financial frictions weaken the relation
between it and qt, while investment and cash ﬂow remain closely related, due to the eﬀect
of cash ﬂow on entrepreneurial net worth.
a1 a2
Model with ﬁnancial friction 0.018 0.444
Frictionless model 0.118 0.000
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) 0.033 (0.016) 0.242 (0.038)
Table 2. Investment regressions.
Third line: Standard errors in parenthesis.
Notice that under the simple AR1 structure for productivity used here, a sizeable cor-
relation between q and investment is still present. Running a simple univariate regression
of investment on q gives a coeﬃcient of 0.13, not too far from the frictionless coeﬃcient,
and an R2 of 0.5. This is not surprising, given that only one shock is present. However,
once cash ﬂow is added to the independent variables, the explanatory power of q falls dra-
matically. To see this, notice that the R2 of the bivariate regression is virtually 1,w h i l e
the R2 of a univariate regression of investment on cash ﬂow alone is 0.995. So the additional
explanatory power of q is less than 1 percent of investment volatility.
17The values of R2 just reported are clearly unrealistic and are a product of the simple
one-shock structure used. Furthermore, idiosyncratic uncertainty and measurement error
are absent from the exercise. For these reasons, we do not attempt to exactly replicate the
empirical coeﬃcients for q and cash ﬂow.16 Instead, our point here is that a reasonable
calibration of the model can help generate realistic coeﬃcients for both q and cash ﬂow, by
introducing a time-varying wedge between marginal q and average q. An extension of the
model that allows for idiosyncratic uncertainty is discussed below.
3.4 Sensitivity
To verify the robustness of our result, we experiment with diﬀerent parameter conﬁgura-
tions, in a neighborhood of the parameters introduced above. Table 3 shows the coeﬃcients
of the investment regression for a sample of these alternative speciﬁcations. Note that our
basic result holds under a large set of possible parametrizations. Moreover, a number of
interesting comparative statics patterns emerge.
a1 a2
Baseline 0.018 0.44
θ =0 .2 0.012 0.50
θ =0 .4 0.025 0.39
α =0 .2 0.022 0.45
α =0 .4 0.017 0.44
ξ =4 0.022 0.67
ξ =1 2 0.015 0.35
lE =0 .1 0.017 0.44
lE =0 .3 0.019 0.45
ρ =0 .6 0.023 0.36
ρ =0 .9 0.011 0.57
Table 3. Sensitivity analysis.
First, notice that increasing θ brings the economy closer to the frictionless benchmark and
reduces the wedge between marginal q and average q. This accounts for the increase in the
coeﬃcient on q and the decrease of the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow when we increase θ.H o w -
ever, this comparative static result does not apply to all parameter changes that bring the
economy closer to the frictionless benchmark. In particular, notice that when we increase lE
(which determines the initial wealth of the entrepreneurs) both the coeﬃcient on q and the
coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow increase.17 This is consistent with the general point raised by Kaplan
16By changing the model parameters, in particular increasing θ and ξ, it is possible to match exactly the
coeﬃcients in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995).
17A similar result emerges if we decrease γ.
18and Zingales (1997), who note that the coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow in investment regressions is
not necessarily a good measure of how tight the ﬁnancial constraint is.
Increasing ξ reduces the response of investment to the productivity shock and decreases
the coeﬃcients of both q and cash ﬂow. Finally, an increase in the persistence of the
technology shock, ρ, tends to lower the coeﬃcient on q and to increase the coeﬃcient on
cash ﬂow. The eﬀect of changing ρ is analyzed in detail in the following subsection.
3.5 Current and future changes in productivity
To further clarify what determines the wedge between marginal and average q,i ti su s e f u l
to compare the eﬀect of shocks with diﬀerent persistence. Figure 3 plots the impulse-
response functions of average q and marginal q for two diﬀerent values of the autocorrelation
coeﬃcient, ρ. They can be compared to the middle panel in Figure 1.
In panel (a) of Figure 3 we plot the eﬀect of a very persistent shock (ρ =0 .98). In this
case, the eﬀect of the shock on future returns dominates the eﬀect on current cash ﬂow.
Entrepreneurial investment becomes very proﬁtable while entrepreneurs’ internal funds are
only catching up gradually. The wedge increases in the short-run, reﬂecting the fact that
the ﬁnancial constraint is initially tighter. In panel (b) we plot the eﬀect of a temporary
shock (ρ =0 ) .T h i ss h o c kh a st h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect on the wedge on impact: internal funds
are higher, while future total factor productivity is unchanged. As investment increases, the
equilibrium rate of return Et [Rt+1]/qm
t falls due to decreasing returns to capital and convex
adjustment costs. The wedge falls, and this eﬀect is so strong that average q and marginal q
move in opposite directions. Marginal q increases, due to the increase in investment, while
average q falls reﬂecting the lowered expected proﬁtability of entrepreneurial investment.
The two plots in Figure 3 show that the wedge between marginal and average q captures
the tension between the future proﬁtability of investment and the current availability of
funds to the entrepreneur. They also suggest that the observed volatility of q depends on
the types of shocks hitting the economy. In Table 4 we report the ratio of the volatility
of q to the volatility of the investment rate, σ (q)/σ (IK),f o rd i ﬀerent values of ρ.F o r
comparison, the value of the ratio σ (q)/σ (IK) for Compustat ﬁrms is equal to 27.18
In the frictionless benchmark, the ratio between asset price volatility and investment
volatility is equal to ξ, which we are keeping constant at 8.5. For values of ρ lower than 0.89
t h ep r e s e n c eo ft h eﬁnancial friction tends to dampen asset price volatility. However, for
higher values of ρ, asset price volatility is ampliﬁed. For example, when ρ =0 .98 the
volatility of q doubles compared to frictionless case, although it is still smaller than in the
data. Highly persistent shocks to productivity help to obtain more volatile asset prices,
by generating variations in the long run expected return on entrepreneurial capital. The
role of shocks to future productivity in magnifying asset price volatility has recently been
emphasized in Abel and Eberly (2005), in the context of a model with no ﬁnancial frictions,
18See footnote 14 for calculation method.

















Figure 3: Responses of q and qm to a technology shock for diﬀerent degrees of persistence.
Panel (a): ρ =0 .98. Panel (b): ρ =0 .
but with decreasing returns and market power. This exercise suggests that a model with
constant returns and ﬁnancial frictions can lead to similar conclusions. The highly persistent
shock considered here is a combination of a change in current productivity and a change
in future productivity. The explicit treatment of pure “news shocks,” only aﬀecting future
productivity, is left to future work (Walentin (2007)).
ρ 0 0.25 .50 0.75 0.98 0.967
ξ 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 18
σ (q)/σ (IK) 1.9 2.3 3.4 5.5 16.5 27
σ (IK)/σ (CFK) 0.19 0.24 0.33 0.48 0.73 0.48
Table 4. Shock persistence and the volatility of q.
In Table 4 we also report the eﬀects of diﬀerent values of ρ on the volatility of in-
vestment σ (IK)/σ (CFK).H i g hv a l u e so fρ tend to increase the volatility of investment
relative to the volatility of cash ﬂow. When we increase ρ we can re-calibrate ξ to keep
σ (IK)/σ (CFK)=0 .48 (as in the baseline calibration above) and this leads to a further
increase in the volatility of q. In particular, setting ρ =0 .967 and ξ =1 8 ,a l l o w su st om a t c h
the empirical values of both σ (IK)/σ (CFK) and σ (q)/σ(IK) (see the last column of Ta-
ble 4). Although the model does well on these dimensions, the required adjustment costs
20seems very high and this parametrization delivers an excessive degree of serial correlation
for cash ﬂow. A relatively easy ﬁx would be to introduce a combination of both temporary
shocks and shocks to long-run productivity. This would allow the model to deliver less serial
correlation, while at the same time having larger movements in q that are uncorrelated with
current investment. Again, this extension is better developed in a model that allows for a
richer set of shocks and is left to future work.
4 Firm-level Heterogeneity
So far, we have focused on an economy where all ﬁrms have the same productivity, and only
aggregate productivity shocks are present. This, together with the assumption of constant
returns to scale, implies that the investment rate, q,a n dc a s hﬂow (normalized by assets) are
identical across ﬁrms. The advantage of this approach is that it makes it easy to compare
our results to the classic Hayashi (1982) model. At the same time, this approach has its
limitations, given that the evidence on the relation between q and investment is largely
based on panel data. Therefore, it is useful to consider variations of the model that allow
for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
An immediate extension is to allow for multiple sectors. If we assume that labor and
capital are immobile across sectors, which may be a reasonable approximation in the short
run, then w and qo are sector-speciﬁc prices and each sector’s dynamics are analogous
to the aggregate dynamics studied above. Therefore, under this interpretation, all the
results presented so far apply to the multiple sector case. In this section, we pursue an
alternative extension, by introducing productivity diﬀerences across ﬁrms. Let Aj,t denote
the productivity of ﬁrm j. Newborn entrepreneurs receive an initial random draw Aj,t
from a given distribution Φ. From then on, individual productivity follows the stationary
process Aj,t = Γ(Aj,t−1,  j,t) with  j,t drawn from the discrete p.d.f. π( j,t). To keep matters
simple, we abstract from aggregate uncertainty and assume that the realized cross-sectional
distribution of the shocks is always identical to the ex-ante distribution for each individual
ﬁrm. The details of this extension are presented in Appendix B.
Given the absence of aggregate uncertainty, aggregate capital is constant in this economy
and so is the wage w and the price of used capital qo.T h i sa l s oi m p l i e st h a tqm is constant
and equal to 1. However, as long as the ﬁnancial constraint is binding, average q is greater
than 1 and is diﬀerent across ﬁrms. The assumption of constant returns to scale still helps
to simplify the problem, as it implies that the investment rate, Tobin’s q, and the cash-
ﬂow-to-assets ratio are independent of the individual ﬁrm’s assets kj,t. However, these three
variables are now functions of the ﬁrm’s productivity Aj,t and are given by the following
three equations,
IKj,t =
(1 − θ)Rj,t − 1
1 − θβCE[Rj,t+1|Aj,t]
− 1,
21qj,t = βE (1 − θ)E
£¡





CFKj,t = Rj,t − qo,
where the return per unit of capital, Rj,t, and the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth,
φj,t,a r en o wﬁrm-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s . 19
The three expressions above for IKj,t, qj,t,a n dCFKj,t, emphasize once more the tension
between current and future changes in productivity discussed in subsection 3.5. On the one
hand, current returns, captured by Rj,t,a ﬀect positively both the investment rate and cash
ﬂow, but have no eﬀect on q, which is a purely forward-looking variable. On the other hand,
future returns, captured by E[Rj,t+1|Aj,t],a ﬀect positively investment and q, but have no
eﬀects on current cash ﬂows.
To study the implications of the model for investment regressions, we construct simulated
time-series from the model described and run the investment regression (19). In Table 5
we report the regression coeﬃcients obtained from the simulated series, using the same
parameters as in Section 3.
a1 a2
Model with ﬁnancial friction 0.116 1.023
Table 5. Investment regression. Firm-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Once more, ﬁnancial frictions introduce a strong correlation between cash ﬂow and in-
vestment, so that cash ﬂow has a positive coeﬃcient in the regression. Notice that both
coeﬃcients a1 and a2 are now larger than in the corresponding line of Table 2 and larger
than their empirical counterpart. This is not surprising, given that ﬁrms now face essentially
zero adjustment costs. In this model, adjustment costs are only due to aggregate changes
in the capital stock, and with no aggregate uncertainty such changes are absent.20 Another
implication of the absence of adjustment costs is that investment is too volatile. The ratio
σ (IK)/σ (CFK) is equal to 1.34 in the simulated series, more than twice as large as in the
data.21 In our model we have essentially assumed “external adjustment costs,” by allowing
ﬁrms to trade homogeneous capital on the used capital market. A fully developed model
with ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks clearly calls for the introduction of “internal adjustment costs,”
both to reduce investment volatility at the ﬁrm level and to obtain more realistic coeﬃ-
cients in investment regressions. However, with internal adjustment costs we lose analytical
tractability, as optimal investment rules are, in general, non-linear.
19Both Rj,t and φj,t are functions only of Aj,t, so the distributions of Rj,t+1 and φj,t+1 conditional on
Aj,t can be obtained from the law of motion Aj,t+1 = Γ(Aj,t,  j,t+1).
20The parameter ξ is accordingly irrelevant for this version of the model.
21Notice also that the frictionless model is not a very useful benchmark in this case, as it gives very
extreme and unrealistic results. Absent ﬁnancial frictions all the capital stock in the economy would go,
each period, to the single ﬁrm with the highest expected return on capital, while q would be constant and
equal to 1.
225C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have developed a tractable framework to study the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
frictions on the joint dynamics of investment and of the value of the ﬁrm. The model shows
that, in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions, q reﬂects future quasi-rents that will go to the
insider. This introduces a wedge between average and marginal q. The size of this wedge
is determined by the tension between current and future proﬁtability. A ﬁrm with high
future productivity and low internal funds today will display a higher q. The reason for
this is that the growth of its capital stock is constrained relative to expected productivity,
and this raises the future marginal product of capital.
The paper focuses on the implications of the model for the correlation between invest-
ment, q and cash ﬂow. In particular, we show that a model with ﬁnancial frictions can help
to replicate the observed low correlation between q and investment, and the fact that cash
ﬂow appears with a positive coeﬃcient in standard investment regressions. However, the
model has a number of additional testable predictions on the response of investment and
asset prices to diﬀerent types of shocks (shocks with diﬀerent persistence, shocks aﬀecting
current/future productivity), as discussed in Section 3.5. As we noticed, recent models with
market power and decreasing returns at the ﬁrm level also display rich dynamics follow-
ing shocks with diﬀerent temporal patterns. Empirical work documenting the conditional
behavior of investment and q following these shocks, would provide an important testing
ground for both classes of models.
Throughout the paper, we have maintained Hayashi’s (1982) assumption of constant
returns to scale both in the production function and in adjustment costs. This has two
advantages. First, it greatly simpliﬁes aggregation. Second, it allows us to focus on the
“pure” eﬀect of the ﬁnancial friction on investment regressions. Models with decreasing
returns at the ﬁrm level can produce deviations from q theory for independent reasons, so
it is useful, at this stage, to separate those eﬀects from the eﬀects due to imperfections in
ﬁnancial contracts. At the same time, this choice leaves aside a number of interesting issues,
which seem especially relevant when one introduces ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, as we did in
Section 4.
Finally, in the paper we have focused on the case of small stochastic deviations from the
steady state. It is possible to extend the model to allow for “large” shocks, opening the door
to potentially interesting phenomena. In particular, with large shocks it is possible to have
a model where ﬁrms hold precautionary reserves, i.e., choose to reduce investment today
in order to buy ﬁnancial securities as insurance against future shocks. This is another area








Suppose ko = κ(qo) is optimal for a given qo and k0 =1 . Constant returns to scale imply that, given
any k0, ko = κ(qo)k0 is a solution to problem (20) and the optimum is equal to (G(κ(qo),1) + qo)k0.
Therefore, we can set
qm (X) ≡ G(κ(qo (X)),1) + qo (X),
completing the proof of the ﬁrst part of the lemma. In a similar way, consider the problem
max
l
AF (k,l) − wl + qok, (21)
and suppose l = η (w,qo,A) is optimal for a given triple w,qo,A and k =1 .C o n s t a n t r e t u r n s
to scale imply that, given any k, l = η (w,qo,A)k is a solution to (21) and the optimum is
(AF (1,η(w,qo,A)) − wη(w,qo,A)+qo)k.S e t t i n g
R(X) ≡ AF (1,η(w(X),qo (X),A)) − w(X)η(w(X),qo (X),A)+qo (X)
completes the proof.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
Let ˜ B be the space of bounded functions φ : X → [1,∞).D e ﬁne the map T : ˜ B → ˜ B as follows
Tφ(X)=
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(H (X, 0)))R(H (X, 0))]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(H (X, 0))]
.
Let us ﬁrst check that Tφ∈ ˜ B if φ ∈ ˜ B,s ot h em a pi sw e l ld e ﬁned. Notice that conditions (a)-(b)
and βE <β C imply that
(1 − θ)βEE[R(H (X, 0))]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(H (X, 0))]
> 1.
This implies that for any φ ∈ ˜ B we have
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(H (X, 0)))R(H (X, 0))]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(H (X, 0))]
≥
βE (1 − θ)E[R(H (X, 0))]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(H (X, 0))]
> 1, (22)
showing that Tφ(X) ≥ 1. Assumption (c) implies that
βE (1 − θ)E[R(H (X, 0))]





so if φ(X) ≤ M for all X ∈ X,t h e nTφ(X) ≤ M/(1 − γ) for all X ∈ X, completing the argument.
Next, we show that T satisﬁes Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction. The monotonic-
ity of T is easily established. To check that it satisﬁes the discounting property notice that if
24φ
0 = φ + a,t h e n
Tφ
0 (X) − Tφ(X)=
βE (1 − γ)(1− θ)E[R(H (X, 0))]
qm (X) − θβCE[R(H (X, 0))]
a<β Ea,
where the inequality follows from assumption (c). Since T is a contraction a unique ﬁxed point
exists and (22) immediately shows that φ(X) > 1 for all X.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
Let φ be deﬁned as in Lemma 2. We proceed by guessing and verifying that the value function
is V (k,b,X)=φ(X)(R(X)k − b). In the text, we have shown that, under this conjecture, the




cE + βE (1 − γ)
X
 0




π ( 0)[R(H (X, 0))k0 − b0
L ( 0)]
s.t. cE + qm (X)k0 ≤ R(X)k − d, (λ)












b0 ( 0) ≤ θR(H (X, 0))k0 for all  0, (ν ( 0)π( 0))
b0
L ( 0) ≤ θR(H (X, 0))k0 for all  0, (νL ( 0)π ( 0))
cE ≥ 0, (τc)
k0 ≥ 0, (τk)
where, in parenthesis, we report the Lagrange multiplier associated to each constraint. The multipli-
ers of the no-default constraints are normalized by the probabilities π( 0).T h eﬁrst-order conditions
for this problem are
1 − λ + τc =0 ,
βEE
£¡
γ +( 1− γ)φ
0¢
R0¤
− λqm (X)+θE[(ν + νL)R0]+τk =0 ,
−βE (1 − γ)φ
0π( 0)+λβC (1 − γ)π( 0) − ν ( 0)π ( 0)=0 ,
−βEγπ( 0)+λβCγπ( 0) − νL ( 0)π ( 0)=0 ,
where R0 and φ
0 are shorthand for R(H (X, 0)) and φ(H (X, 0)). We want to show that the values
for cE,k0,b 0 and b0
L in the statement of the proposition are optimal. It is immediate to check
that they satisfy the problem’s constraints. To show that they are optimal we need to show that









which, by construction, is equal to φ(X).T h e nw eh a v e
τc = φ(X) − 1 > 0,
25which follows from Lemma 2,
ν ( 0)=( 1− γ)(βCφ(X) − βEφ(H (X, 0))) > 0,
which follows from condition (d), and
νL ( 0)=( 1− γ)(βCφ(X) − βE) > 0,
which follows from φ(X) > 1 and βC >β E. Substituting the optimal values in the objective
function we obtain φ(X)(R(X)k − b) conﬁrming our initial guess.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
The proof is split in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we derive the steady state of the deterministic
economy, in the second, we construct an equilibrium of the stochastic economy. Conditions (A) and
(B) will be introduced in the course of the argument. First, we derive a useful preliminary result.
Applying the envelope theorem to problems (20) and (21) (see the proof of Lemma 1), using the
fact that, in equilibrium, the ratio ko/k0 is equal to Kt/Kt+1,a n dt h er a t i ol/k is equal to 1/Kt,














Step 1. (Deterministic steady state) Consider a deterministic model where At is constant and
equal to 1 in each period (recall that 1 is the unconditional mean of the stochastic process for At
in the stochastic model). We will derive a steady state of this deterministic model and use it as a
reference point for the stochastic case. Let the superscript S denotes steady-state values. In steady
state the equilibrium conditions (12) and (23) give qo,S =1− δ and qm,S =1 . The law of motion
for the capital stock (9) gives the steady-state condition
¡
1 − θβCRS¢









Substituting (26) in (25) we obtain
KS =
µ
α(θβC +( 1− γ)(1− θ)) + γ (1 − α)lE













1 − (θβC +( 1− γ)(1− θ))(1 − δ)




The following three inequalities follow from assumption (A):
βERS > 1,θ β CRS < 1,
(1 − γ)(1− θ)RS
1 − θβCRS < 1,
(these correspond to assumptions (a)-(c) in Proposition 3). The ﬁrst inequality follows imme-
diately. To show that the second inequality holds notice that assumption (A) implies that 1 −
(βCθ +( 1− γ)(1− θ))(1 − δ) is positive, given that βE (1 − δ) < 1. Then, (27) gives us KS > 0.
Rearranging equation (25), one can then show that
1 − βCθRS − (1 − γ)(1− θ)RS > 0,
which implies both the second and the third inequalities.










Rearranging this equation shows that φ
S > 1. Condition (d) holds immediately, given that βE <β C.
Step 2. (Stability) Substituting (11), (24) and the lagged version of (10) into (9), we obtain the
following second-order stochastic diﬀerence equation for Kt
Kt+1 =




















Linearizing this equation (under the functional assumptions made in the text) we get the following
second order equation for kt =l nKt − lnKS,
α0kt + α1kt+1 + α2kt+2 =0 ,
where
α0 = ξ + α(1 − α)(γlE − (1 − γ)(1− θ))
¡
KS¢α−1
+( RS − ξ)(1− γ)(1− θ),
α1 = −ξ − 1+βθRS − βθ
³
ξ + α(1 − α)
¡
KS¢α−1´




1 − α0α2 > 0 (B)
it is possible to show that the steady state KS is saddle-path stable. Then, given suﬃciently small
shocks we can construct a stochastic steady state where Kt varies in a neighborhood of KS.T h i s
gives us an ergodic distribution for the state vector X, with bounded support. We can then establish
27t h ec o n t i n u i t yo ft h ef u n c t i o nφ with respect to the parameters X and show that φ(X) is bounded
in [φ,φ]. Since (a)-(c) hold in the deterministic steady state, a continuity argument shows that they
hold in the stochastic steady state. Finally, A − A can be set so as to ensure that the bounds for
φ(X) satisfy
βCφ >β Eφ.
This guarantees that condition (d) is also satisﬁed.
B. The model with ﬁrm-level heterogeneity
Let w and qo denote the constant values for the wage and the price of used capital. The (gross)




Aj,tF (1,η) − wη + q0ª
,
where η is the labor to capital ratio. The state variables for an individual entrepreneur are now
kj,t,b j,t, and Aj,t. The entrepreneur’s problem is characterized by the Bellman equation:
V (k,b,A)= m a x
cE,k0,b0(.),b0
L(.)
cE + βE (1 − γ)E[V (k0,b 0 ( 0),Γ(A, 0))] +
+βEγE[R(Γ(A, 0))k0 − b0
L ( 0)]
subject to
cE + k0 ≤ R(A)k − d,
b = d + βC ((1 − γ)E[b0 ( 0)] + γE[b0
L ( 0)]),
b0 ( 0) ≤ θR(Γ(A, 0))k0,
b0
L ( 0) ≤ θR(Γ(A, 0))k0.
The no-default constraints have been expressed as linear constraints, proceeding as we did in Propo-
sition 3.
Now the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth, φ, is a function of the individual productivity
A and we have
φ(A)=
βE (1 − θ)E[(γ +( 1− γ)φ(Γ(A, 0)))R(Γ(A, 0))]
1 − θβCE[R(Γ(A, 0))]
.
The analogues to conditions (a)-(d) are now
βEE[R(Γ(A, 0))] > 1,
θβCE[R(Γ(A, 0))] < 1,
(1 − γ)(1− θ)E[R(Γ(A, 0))]







Under these conditions the optimal individual policy can be derived as in Proposition 3, and we
28obtain the following law of motion for the individual capital stock
k0 =
(1 − θ)R(A)
1 − θβCE[R(Γ(A, 0))]
k.
A newborn entrepreneur has initial wealth wlE. Putting together these conditions, the distribution
Φ and the law of motion Γ(A, 0), allows us to completely characterize the joint dynamics of k and
A. Then, under appropriate assumptions, we obtain an ergodic joint distribution J (A,k) and check
that the wage rate w is consistent with the market clearing condition
Z
[η(A)k]dJ (A,k)=1 ,
where η(A) is the optimal labor to capital ratio for a ﬁrm with productivity A.
Proceeding as in subsection 2.5, we can deﬁne the ﬁnancial value of a continuing ﬁrm j:
pj,t = φj,t (Rj,tkj,t − bj,t)+bj,t − dj,t.














Dividing both sides by kj,t+1 and using the recursive property of φj,t gives the following expression
for Tobin’s q
qj,t = βE (1 − θ)E
£¡















w h i c hg i v e st h ee x p r e s s i o ni nt h et e x t .F o rc a s hﬂow notice that Aj,tF (kj,t,lj,t)−wlj,t = Rj,tkj,t −
qokj,t.
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